Investment opportunities, corporate governance quality, and firm performance in the UAE by Al-Gamrh, Bakr et al.
Investment opportunities,
corporate governance quality, and
firm performance in the UAE
Bakr Al-Gamrh
Rennes School of Business, Rennes, France
Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail
Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok, Malaysia
Tanveer Ahsan
Rennes School of Business, Rennes, France, and
Abdulsalam Alquhaif
University of Hail, Hail, Saudi Arabia and
Ibb University, Ibb, Yemen
Abstract
Purpose –This paper examines the influence of investment opportunities on firm performance and evaluates
corporate governance practices in theUnitedArabEmirates (UAE) to determinewhether corporate governance
quality moderates that influence.
Design/methodology/approach – A fixed-effects regression was employed to examine the influence of
investment opportunities on firm performance and the role of corporate governance quality as a moderator for
all listed firms on the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange (ADX) and the Dubai Financial Market (DFM).We examined
501 firm-year observations for the period when the corporate governance code in the UAE was coming into
force, from 2008 to 2012.
Findings – The regression results indicate that investment opportunities have a negative influence on firm
performance. The corporate governance index used here shows that the level of corporate governance
practiced in the UAE isweak.We also find that strong corporate governance ameliorates the negative influence
of investment opportunities, which supports our hypotheses. The sub-indices of corporate governance that
matter the most for moderating investment opportunities are board functioning and ethics.
Practical implications – The results of this paper reflect the need to examine corporate governance in the
context of the external environment represented by investment opportunities in our study. The findings could
raise awareness of the importance of strong corporate governance practices, not only to directly improve firm
performance but also through its influence on external variables. Legislators, regulators and other interested
parties could use these results to examine practices in the UAE following the implementation of the corporate
governance code.
Originality/value –This study contributes to the literature by evaluating the role that corporate governance
quality and its components could play in firm performance and indirectly moderating other external factors
(such as investment opportunities).
Keywords Corporate governance quality, Investment opportunities, Firm performance, The UAE
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Following the global financial crisis, it was generally realized that weak corporate
governance can have potential macroeconomic, long-term and distributional consequences
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Companies have massive exposure to each other and to the
external environment because their corporate governance is connected to their strategies,
which are impacted by their external environment in a tight mesh of interconnecting factors
(Al-Gamrh et al., 2018; Hutchinson andGul, 2004). The board of directors plays a vital role in a
successful corporate governance system (Adawi and Rwegasira, 2011) and in the functioning
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Growth is desirable for companies and for any country’s economy as a whole. Using
contracting theory, previous studies suggest that there is a negative influence of investment
opportunities on firm performance (Baker, 1993; Gul, 1999). Firms for which more investment
opportunities are available tend to spend more to take advantage of them. These firms incur
greater costs, including higher monitoring costs, higher compensation, more use of stock
options, and the additional cost of using alternative accounting performance measures
(Anderson et al., 1993; Bushman et al., 1996; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Skinner, 1993; Smith and
Watts, 1992).
The quality of corporate governance that mitigates this negative influence is based on the
assumption from agency theory that corporate governance reduces agency costs (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). There is greater information asymmetry for firms that have greater
investment opportunities because managers have information on the value of future projects
that is not available for shareholders (Ali et al., 2018). This information asymmetry can be
reduced by the presence of strong corporate governance. This study examines how the
negative influence of investment opportunities on firm performance can be mitigated by the
implementation of good corporate governance practices.
Previous studies that focus on the direct relationship between corporate governance and
firm performance find mixed results (Abdullah et al., 2014; Aebi et al., 2012; Owusu andWeir,
2016; Peni and V€ah€amaa, 2012). Some find a negative impact of corporate governance
variables on performance (Aebi et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012),
which contradicts agency theory. However, these studies limit themselves to examining the
direct impact of corporate governance variables.
However, corporate governance is more clearly seen in its indirect effects (Hutchinson and
Gul, 2004; Rabi et al., 2010). Some previous studies have separately examined the interaction
of corporate governance variables and not the quality of corporate governance as a complete
system that could affect different companies differently. In fact, the interactions found
between individual corporate governance variables imply that they are not independently
determined (Gillan et al., 2003). Empirical evidence has shown that the interdependence of
several corporate governance variables can result in better control of agency problems
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011). Lan and Li (2007) indicate that
corporate governance can be examined more effectively as an entire system because
individual variables may affect each other.
Therefore, we examine the moderating role of corporate governance quality in the
relationship between investment opportunities and firmperformance in theUAE, an emerging
market with a high rate of investment opportunities. Dubai was ranked as having the highest
construction growth in the world before the financial crisis (Langdon, 2008), when its growth
was interrupted. The UAE Minister of the Economy indicated that the lack of corporate
governance was amajor failure that contributed to the UAE’s financial crisis (AMEinfo, 2010),
similar to what was reported by the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee (FCIC, 2011).
This article makes three major contributions. First, it evaluates the corporate governance
practices of the listed firms on theAbuDhabi Stock Exchange (ADX) and theDubai Financial
Market (DFM) over the critical five-year period of 2008–2012, the introduction of the
corporate governance code to the UAE. Second, it highlights the important influence of
investment opportunities on firm performance, a topic that has not been well studied globally
(Sardo and Serrasqueiro, 2018).
Third, this article integrates a review of corporate governance quality and its components,
namely, disclosure, board composition, and ethics, as a moderator for the relationship
between investment opportunities and firm performance. The empirical undertaken here test
expands our understanding of how investment opportunities influence firm performance and
how this influence is affected by corporate governance quality and its components. The




UAE. In Section 3, a literature review is conducted, and hypotheses are developed. Following
this, the research design and data collection are presented in Section 4. Section 5 reports the
results, and Section 6 concludes the study.
2. Corporate governance in the UAE
The UAE exhibits a growing economy and is developing into a financial and commercial hub
for its region. Stock markets in the UAEwere only established in 2000. To build trust in them
and to gain investors’ confidence, the government produced targeted legislation, including
regulations for corporate governance. To meet this need, the UAE Securities and
Commodities Authority (SCA) introduced its Corporate Governance Code in 2009, which
applies to all listed firms on the ADX and the DFM; this code came into force in April 2010.
The Corporate Governance Code is based on the high standards of international corporate
governance. It consists of 16 main articles that cover all aspects of corporate governance in a
firm. These articles are summarized in Table 1.
Article
number Function
1 Gives the definitions for the code, including clarification of its terms
2 Appoints the SCA as official regulator of corporate governance for listed firms and indicates
the scope of application of the code, including all listed firms with the exception of foreign,
government-owned and financial companies
3 Sets the method for appointing boards of directors. For example, one-third of the board
members shall be independent, and the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman of the
board should be different individuals
4 Defines the authority of the chairman of the board of directors
5 Lists the duties and responsibilities of the board of directors, oriented toward the main aim of
creating wealth and working in the shareholders’ interests
6 Requires the board to form directly affiliated board committees and explains the role of these
committees, including the audit, remuneration and nomination committees and the methods
of their establishment
7 Discusses the remuneration of the board. The article clarifies that board members’
remuneration should not exceed 10% of the corporation’s net profits
8 Sets out the rules of the internal control system and explains the objectives and powers for
internal audits. The internal control system should be independent and report directly to the
board of directors, and the main elements that should be covered by the system and the
importance of disclosures are covered
9 Describes the audit committee and explains the process of forming such a committee, along
with its duties and responsibilities
10 Imposes the requirements for external audit and the procedures for auditor appointment
11 Discusses the rights of the board of directors to delegate authority. Explains the power of the
board of directors to delegate a board member or firm executive to handle certain
administrative issues
12 Outlines shareholders’ rights, such as the right to distribute dividends and attend and vote in
the general assembly meetings, taking part in deliberations and granting access to the firm’s
financial reporting
13 Explains the code of conduct and urges firms to implement environmental and social policy
toward local society
14 Requires all listed firms to issue a corporate governance report that details adherence to the
requirements of the SCA, including any violations of the code during the previous financial
year
15 States the administrative penalties that could be imposed on firms that violate the code,
including suspension or delisting or a financial penalty
16 Sets April 30, 2010, as date that the code comes into effect for listed firms
Table 1.







3. Literature review and hypothesis development
The theoretical framework of this study is based on two main theories. Hussain et al. (2018)
acknowledge the need formore than one theory to be used for corporate governance research.
This study brings Agency Theory and Contracting Theory to bear.
Agency Theory provides an explanation of the relationships among principals and agents
in economic resources, where the principals are the shareholders, and the agents are the
managers who control the resources of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It draws
attention to the fact that managers have more information than shareholders because they
have more control over firm operations, which make it difficult for shareholders to monitor
them effectively (Adams, 1994). Therefore, because the agents/managers have additional
information on economic resources, they may tend to maximize their own interests at the
expense of those of their principals (Dzingai and Fakoya, 2017; Hussain et al., 2018).
Corporate governancemechanisms are used inmost shareholding organizations tomanage
conflicts that might occur between managers and shareholders. Corporate governance can
create effective monitoring andmitigate any opportunistic behaviors by themanagement that
might hurt minority shareholders (Al-Jaifi et al., 2017). However, the arrangements that are
necessary to mitigate agency costs may also have other high costs, namely, direct costs could
be incurred in the design, execution, and enforcement of contracts between conflicting parties
with different interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Loss might accrue to principals when they
seek to impose absolute monitoring of agents or where agents must guarantee to principals
that there is no divergence in their interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Further, Agency Theory considers agency costs to be a driver of maintaining certain
quality of corporate governance. Such costs are associated with divergent agency problems
or information asymmetry. For instance, in Agency Theory, information asymmetry is more
frequent in firmswith greater investment opportunities (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). Previous
studies have found that such firms must respond to more related issues, such as
consideration of the best use tomake of stock options and the addition of compensation levels,
which might increase monitoring costs and the incentive to adopt other accounting measures
of performance and reporting (Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Smith and Watts, 1992). Gillan et al.
(2003) argue that greater discretion in project selection could be accompanied by
management action to take advantage of greater opportunities, which could make board
monitoring more beneficial for high-growth industries or those that have additional
investment opportunities.
Ali et al. (2018) suggest that the difficulty of monitoring management varies in companies
with different levels of investment opportunities. Other studies argue that the cost of
monitoring is greater for companies with greater investment opportunities because these
companies have large communication costs and information acquisition (Chen, 2015; Coles
et al., 2008; Monem, 2013).
Taking another view on governance and investment opportunity, using Contracting
Theory, Smith and Watts (1992) propose that investment opportunities can contribute
significantly to the determination of corporate governance and financial policies. They
indicate that environmental factors could influence several aspects of corporate governance.
Contracting Theory is derived from a combination of particular models with analyses and
perceptions of the ways in which companies generally construct contracts, and this provides
a way to forecast relationships between investment opportunities and variables of corporate
policies (Baker, 1993). Furthermore, Hutchinson and Gul (2004) suggest that Contracting
Theory indicates a negative relationship between investment opportunity and firm
performance. Therefore, we develop the following hypothesis





Corporate governance controls are intended to encourage management to achieve the
objectives that can maximize shareholders’ wealth and limit activities that might reduce the
wealth of shareholders (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). It is also suggested that managers could
act contrary to owners’ interests in the absence of such controls (Fama and Jensen, 1983). These
considerations indicate the potential importance of the governance system and its possible
moderating relationship with firm performance. Corporate governance helps advance and
stabilize firm performance and ensures accountability and transparency (Faruqi et al., 2019).
Therefore, firms with good corporate governance quality may receive better monitoring,
and the shareholder–manager conflict of interestsmay bemitigated, which in turn can reduce
agency costs (Dittmar andMahrt-Smith, 2007;Masulis et al., 2007). Shareholders in firmswith
high investment opportunities may prefer strong governance mechanisms to ensure their
survival. Strong corporate governance could decrease the information asymmetry that may
arise in firms with high growth as a result of possession by managers of private information
on the value of future projects that is not available to shareholders (Ali et al., 2018).
Firms with more investment opportunities tend to spend more to take advantage of them,
which reflects negatively on firm performance. Previous studies have indicated that firms
with greater investment opportunities have higher monitoring costs, pay higher
compensation, and incur a variety of other higher costs as assessed by alternative
accounting performance measures (Anderson et al., 1993; Bushman et al., 1996; Gaver and
Gaver, 1993; Skinner, 1993; Smith and Watts, 1992; Sun et al., 2014). However, corporate
governance, according to Agency Theory, moderates the negative relationship, as
monitoring and incentives are major governance functions that can lower agency costs
and information asymmetry.
Investment opportunities worldwide were affected by the exogenous shocks of the global
financial crisis. Some studies have indicated that corporate governance is a better tool to
explain variations in firm performance indirectly through a firm’s organizational
environment. Three such studies in particular have suggested that the level of investment
opportunities is an important organizational and environmental variable (Chen et al., 2010;
Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). Thus, it is posited in some research that the negative relationship
between investment opportunities and firm performance is moderated by corporate
governance (Baker, 1993; Gul, 1999).
The negative relationship between corporate governance and firm performance has been
questioned (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Sanjai Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). The theoretical models
of Hutchinson and Gul (2004) suggest the existence of a negative relationship between
investment opportunities and firm performance and that some corporate governance
variables act as a moderator. This posits that the negative impact of growth options on
performance is attenuated where corporate governance is stronger. Hutchinson and Gul
(2004) anticipate that the negative relationship weakens when the tested corporate
governance variables have a greater effect on firms with higher investment opportunities
that are difficult to monitor.
Other studies that consider related variables include those of Al-Gamrh et al. (2018), Chen
et al. (2010), Sun et al. (2014), and Hutchinson and Gul (2006). Hutchinson and Gul (2006)
examine Australian firms and demonstrate that the combination of option plans and
opportunities for investment are associated with increasing financial performance. Their
results show a positive relationship between firm investment opportunities and firm
performance but only in the presence of the option plans; otherwise, this association is
negative. Chen et al. (2010) also investigate other variables, such as external financing needs
and opportunities for investment. They report a positive effect of external financing needs on
the influence of corporate governance on firm value. Sun et al. (2014) find that the
implementation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act mitigates the impact of independence on the





Studies that examine the influence of investment opportunities on firm performance are
scarce (Sardo and Serrasqueiro, 2018) and none take the quality of corporate governance into
consideration, although it is often suggested that corporate governance should be studied as
a system (Agrawal andKnoeber, 1996; Bekiris andDoukakis, 2011; Gillan et al., 2003; Lan and
Li, 2007). Therefore, this study constructs the following hypothesis:
H2. Corporate governance quality has a positively moderating role in the relationship
between investment opportunities and firm performance.
4. Research methodology
4.1 Data collection
Unlike previous studies, which concentrate on cross-sectional data or data on selected
corporate governance variables (Adawi and Rwegasira, 2010; Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007;
Arouri et al., 2014; Hussainey and Aljifri, 2012), we employed a firm-level panel of all listed
firms on the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange (ADX) and the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) from
2008 to 2012. Both markets have an average of 128 firms listed each year. We excluded firms
with unavailable data, and our final data set was made up of 501 firm-year observations as
can be seen in Table 2. Financial firmswere included because they account for around 50%of
the firm-year observations and played a vital role in the crisis. Other studies in this area also
include financial firms, including Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Al-Gamrh et al. (2020), Al-
Gamrh et al. (2018), and Coles et al. (2008). To the best of our knowledge, our data set is one of
the largest corporate governance sets that have been reviewed for the Middle East region.
The descriptive data for the sample firms are given in Table 2, organized by year and
stock market. Only firms with data available for all variables were included in the analysis.
Corporate governance data was hand-collected from companies’ annual reports and the
websites of the stockmarkets, and the balance-sheet and income-statement itemsweremostly
obtained from Datastream and ThomsonWorldscope. Other financial data, such as beta and
market return were collected from Gulfbase.
4.2 Measurement of variables and model specifications
4.2.1 Corporate governance quality. To measure corporate governance quality, we used the
index developed by Al-Gamrh et al. (2018), the first comprehensive index to evaluate the
quality of corporate governance developed for use in the UAE. The original version of this
index was developed by Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) to evaluate two developing
economies, Brazil and Chile. Amodified version of the indexwas used byGaray andGonzalez
(2008) for Venezuela. Al-Gamrh’s index was modified to take into consideration the
environment of the UAE and its code of corporate governance. The items were updated with
reference to UAE regulations and the code of corporate governance. Tsamenyi and Uddin
(2008) urge emerging countries to take the specific needs of individual countries into
consideration when weighing corporate governance reforms.
Population Unavailable data Final sample
Years ADX DFM ADX DFM ADX DFM Total
2012 66 57 9 13 57 44 101
2011 67 61 11 17 56 44 100
2010 64 65 7 21 57 44 101
2009 67 66 10 22 57 44 101
2008 65 65 11 21 54 44 98






The index includes 14 items, covering three main categories: board composition and
functioning, ethics, and conflicts of interest and disclosure. Each question for the index is a
dummy that can be answered with either a yes or a no. Corporate governance indices are an
effective tool for evaluating corporate governance in emerging economies, particularly
because companies in these countries do not attract as much attention from global
governance rating agencies. Several studies use corporate governance indices in emerging
markets, including Kohli and Saha (2008), Siagian et al. (2013) and Elghuweel et al. (2017).
4.2.2 Independent and control variables. Investment opportunities are defined as the
market-to-book value of equity at the end of the year (Adam and Goyal, 2008). Because the
size of the firm can affect investment opportunities and firm performance, we controlled for
firm size, measured as log of total assets. We also included beta to control for risk and
leverage, calculated as total debt divided by total assets.
4.2.3 Regression models.To test the hypotheses, we used fixed-effect models as suggested
by the Hausman test. In addition, Baddeley and Barrowclough (2009) andWooldridge (2010)
discuss the importance of taking account of the individual unique factors of panel data
observations that are constant over time and cannot be assumed to be independently
distributed among times. To attain the objectives of this study, two regression models were
created. The first tested the direct influence of investment opportunities on firm performance.
The second tested the moderating effects of corporate governance quality on the
relationship between investment opportunity and firm performance.
Perfit ¼ β0 þ β1 SIZEit þ β2 RISKit þ β3 LVRGit þ β4 INVSTit þ β5 CGit
þ β6 Year dummies þ εit (1)
Perfit ¼ β0 þ β1 SIZEit þ β2 RISKit þ β3 LVRGit þ β4 INVSTit þ β5 CGit
þ β6 ðINVST3CGÞ it þ β7 Year dummies þ εit (2)
where Perf represents the return on assets (ROA) of firm i at time t, SIZE is the logarithm of
total assets, RISK is the firm’s beta, LVRG is total debt divided by total assets, INVST is the




The descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 3. The current study gives a
panel data analysis of 501 firm-year observations for 2008–2012. Table 3 presents the
summary statistics of the complete 501 firm-year observations. Firm performance, as
measured by ROA, varied from as low as 44.35% to a maximum of 29.18%, a mean of
1.94%. This mean score is similar to those reported by Al-Tamimi and Charif (2011) for 38
Emirates banks in 1996–2005 and Hassan and Halbouni (2013), who examined data from 95
listed Emirates firms for 2008.
Investment opportunities (INVST), represented by market to book value, vary from a low
of 0.01% to a high of 61.24%, with a mean value of 2.45%. The mean scores found were
similar to the means reported by Arouri et al. (2014), who studied 58 GCC banks for the year
2010. The average leverage (LVRG) was 16.28%, with a range from 0 to 78.64%, indicating
that some firms are highly leveraged, and others had no leverage. These statistics were





score of 13 to the lowest of 1, with a mean of 7.95. The corporate governance statistics are
discussed in the next section.
5.2 Descriptive statistics of corporate governance
The quality of corporate governance in the UAEhas recently shown dramatic improvements.
Table 4 shows what proportion of listed companies meet measures of corporate governance
by year. The corporate governance code was introduced in 2007 and entered into force in
2010. It should be noted that the overall values for sub-indices of disclosure and board
functioning in the data show an increase from 2008 to 2011. This increase slowed or the
values maintained their level in 2012, which may be because firms judged the regulations to
be lax or the penalties for non-compliance to be low.AhmedHaji andMubaraq (2015) also find
that some Malaysian firms did not comply with certain basic mandatory requirements of the
Malaysian corporate governance code. The board of directors became more independence as
time passed, and more board committees were created. It can also be seen that some
companies have retained CEO duality, although the code requires the CEO and chair of the
board for all companies to be different individuals. The sub-index of ethics and conflict of
interest showed a dramatic jump after the implementation of the corporate governance code.
However, the level then decreased in 2012. This shows that companies only respond to
regulations, without prioritizing environmental and social issues.
5.3 Correlation analysis
The Pearson and Spearman correlations are commonly used to check for multicollinearity.
Table 5 shows a Pearson correlation matrix for the data, indicating that there is no high
correlation score among the examined variables. We also used the variance inflation factor
(VIF) test and find no evidence of multicollinearity among our main variables.
5.4 Regression results and discussions
According to contracting theory, investment opportunities may have a negative influence on
firm performance. We ran a fixed-effects regression to estimate the direct effects and the
interaction models for investment opportunities. We used the Wooldridge test for
autocorrelation and the Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence and found presence
of these two issues. Therefore, we ran a robust regression using Driscoll–Kraay standard
errors to avoid any autocorrelation or cross-sectional dependence (Hoechle, 2007), and we
found the results shown in Table 6. In Model 1, the results indicated that investment
opportunities (INVST) were negatively related to firm performance at a 1% significance level.
High investment opportunities, as hypothesized, negatively influenced firm performance.
VARIABLES N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
ROA 501 1.943 7.447 44.35 29.18
INVST 501 2.451 5.112 0.0100 61.24
LEVERAGE 501 16.28 17.92 0 78.64
CG 501 7.954 2.741 1 13
SIZE 501 6.398 0.861 4.258 8.489
RISK 501 0.496 0.550 0.252 2.242
Number of firms 101 101 101 101 101
Note(s): Performance is represented by the ROA of the firm; INVST is the market to book value of the
company; CG is corporate governance, as measured the corporate governance index; SIZE is the logarithm of






Questions/Years 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Disclosure 67.45% 68.70% 71.82% 76.32% 76.15%
(1) Is there information in the company’s annual
report, website, or public disclosure documents on
potential conflicts of interest, such as related-party
transactions? (Annual reports were checked for a
section on related-party transactions.)
89.60% 91.60% 90.70% 95.30% 98.10%
(2) Does the company specify in its annual reports or
through othermeans sanctions againstmanagement in
the case of violations of corporate governance
regulations? (Annual reports and other means were
checked for reports on any sanctions.)
0.00% 0.00% 4.70% 8.40% 3.70%
(3) Does the company produce its legally required
financial reports by the required date? (It was checked
whether the company had published its legally
required reports by March 31 of the given year, which
is the legal limit date.)
93.40% 90.70% 92.50% 91.60% 95.30%
(4) Does the company use an international
accounting standard, such as the IFRS?
83.00% 93.50% 96.30% 95.30% 95.30%
(5) Does the company use the services of one of the
leading global auditing firms? (It was verified whether
the company uses one of the Big Four auditing firms.)
80.20% 78.50% 81.30% 83.20% 81.30%
(6) Does the company disclose on a website or in its
annual report the compensation information for its
CEO and board members? (It was verified whether any
compensation information was disclosed in any data
source.)
58.50% 57.90% 65.40% 84.10% 83.20%
Board composition and functioning 49.10% 57.00% 67.28% 79.43% 79.93%
(7) Are the chairman of the board and the CEO
different persons? (It was verified whether the name of
the chairman and CEO were different.)
75.50% 82.20% 85.00% 88.80% 90.70%
(8) Does the company feature monitoring
committees, such as a compensation and/or
nominations and/or audit committee? (It was
determined whether the company had one or all of
these committees.)
7.50% 19.6 % 43.0 % 76.6 % 77.6 %
(9) Is the board clearly made up of outside and
possibly independent directors? (It was verified
whether at least one-third of the board members were
independent.)
33.20% 43.00% 56.10% 65.40% 66.40%
(10) Is the size of the board from five to ninemembers,
as recommended by international best practices? (It
was verified whether the board consisted of more than
four and less than ten board members.)
80.20% 83.20% 85.00% 86.90% 85.00%
Ethics and conflicts of interest 2.13% 5.58% 16.35% 48.60% 42.30%
(11) Is the company free of SCApenalties and/or fines
for governance malpractice or other securities law
violations over the last year? (It was determined
whether the company had paid a fine to the SCA in the
given year.)
0.00% 3.70% 15.90% 51.40% 43.90%
(12) Is there an internal audit system in place in the
company? (It was examined whether the firm had an
internal audit unit in operation during the year.)









Questions/Years 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
(13) Does the firm have any human and social
development programs? (The social development
activities of the firm were investigated.)
1.90% 2.80% 2.80% 26.20% 20.60%
(14) Does the firm use environmentally friendly
materials or does it make any positive contribution to
the environment? (It was seen whether the firm
contributed in any way to the protection of the
environment.)
4.70% 9.30% 10.30% 52.30% 40.20%
Table 4.
ROA INVST CG LEVG SIZE RISK VIF
ROA 1
INVST 0.2171** 1 1.22
CG 0.1335** 0.2358** 1 1.08
LVRG 0.2208** 0.2437** 0.0406 1 1.22
SIZE 0.0464 0.1943** 0.0638 0.2681** 1 1.26
RISK 0.2240** 0.1380** 0.1603** 0.2056** 0.3595** 1 1.20
Note(s): ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed), * correlation is significant at the 0.05 level
(two-tailed)
Fixed-effects models with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors


















Adj R-square 0.464 0.473
Year FE YES YES











Firms with such opportunities carry greater risk and therefore have high capital costs and
low performance. This result supports Hypothesis 1, that there is a negative relationship
between investment opportunities and firm performance.
Performance is represented by the ROA of the firm: INVST is the market to book value of
the company; CG is corporate governance, measured the corporate governance index; SIZE is
the logarithm of total assets; RISK is the firm’s beta; and LEVERAGE is the total debt divided
by total assets.
Previous studies have found that higher compensation and monitoring costs are
associated with higher growth (Anderson et al., 1993; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Sun et al., 2014).
Firms with greater investment opportunities spend more resources on such opportunities,
which are possible failures that would reflect negatively on the firms’ performance.
Such firms also exhibit more information asymmetry because managers have more
undisclosed information on future projects which is not available to shareholders or the
public (Ali et al., 2018). Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) found no over-investment by firms
based on the assumption that managers may have private benefits but provided evidence of
under-investing by managers due to private costs of investment.
In Table 6, the results for the interaction of corporate governance quality with investment
opportunities and ROA from Models 2 are shown. It was assumed that the stronger the
system of corporate governance was, the better the firm was monitored. Verification of the
belief that strong corporate governance systems positively moderate the relationship
between the independent variables and firm performance was attempted.
The results indicated that corporate governance quality positively moderated the
relationship between investment opportunities and firm performance. Thus, the negative
influence of investment opportunities on performance was adjusted by proper corporate
governance quality. This result implies that good corporate governance systems can play a
significant role in reducing the cost of monitoring large investment opportunities that
enhance the performance of the firm. In other words, firms with large investment
opportunities increase their profitability only if they have strong corporate governance. It
would be logical to conclude that the quality of corporate governance helps firms with large
investment opportunities to monitor their investment activities more effectively.
This result was consistent with agency theory and in line with Ali et al. (2018), who argue
that firmswithmore investment opportunities suffer fromworse information asymmetry and
are in greater need of governance control (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). Hutchinson and Gul
(2004) find that greater levels of executive independence and remuneration weaken the
negative association between growth and firmperformance. Our findings support and extend
their results, providing evidence that the quality of corporate governance as a complete
system can play a more efficient role and positively moderate the relationship between
investment opportunity and performance. The results in Table 6 show that corporate
governance quality mitigates the negative impact of investment opportunities.
6. Additional analysis
The studywent further, analyzingwhich part of corporate governancemattersmore and how
the components of the corporate governance index (disclosure, board composition, and ethics)
influence firm performance and the relationship between investment opportunities and firm
performance. For that reason, we ran a regression for each sub-index of the corporate
governance index, as seen in Table 7. The influence of disclosure alone directly influences
firm performance, and no direct significant influence of board functioning and ethics.
The calculation of interaction influence shows that board functioning and ethics mitigate
the negative influence of investment opportunities. This means that stronger boards can





profitability. Dzingai and Fakoya (2017) argue that board functions are very important
elements, which can enhance firm performance and that monitoring the effectiveness of the
board is crucial. Agency theory explains the separation of management and ownership and
the importance of the board’s role of monitoring managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The
results of this study also support the proposition that better ethics for a company improves
the negative influence of investment opportunities on its performance. Lins, Servaes, and
Tamayo (2017) find that firms with strong social capital experience high profitability and
growth. However, this disclosure is not significant when it comes to monitoring the
company’s growth.
Performance is represented by the ROA of the firm; INVST is the market to book value of
the company; SIZE is the logarithm of total assets; RISK is the firm’s beta; and LEVERAGE is
the total debt divided by total assets. DIS, BOARD, and ETHICS are the three components/
sub-indices of CG.
7. Conclusion
Following the global financial crisis, many academic and legal bodies concentrated on the
issue of corporate governance and the role it plays in preventing unexpected shocks. This
study focused on the influence of the quality of corporate governance in an emerging market,
the UAE. Growth is an important factor for such an economy and for many companies in it as
well, and growth was disrupted by the 2008 financial crisis. This study examined the role of
corporate governance in moderating the influence of investment opportunities on firm
performance. This study evaluated the quality of corporate governance for firms listed on the
Fixed-effects with Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors
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ADX and DFM and explored the indirect influence of corporate governance on those firms’
performance.
The direct relationship between investment opportunities and firm performance was
found to be as hypothesized. The influence of investment opportunities on firm performance
was negatively significant. This result is in line with the conjecture of Contracting Theory,
supporting the contention that the more investment opportunities that a firm has, the more it
costs to maintain opportunities, which reduces performance.
It was found that firms with good corporate governance can evade the negative influence
of investment opportunities on firm performance. This study provides evidence that the
quality of corporate governance plays an important, although indirect, role, mitigating
external factors that could influence firm performance. The results of this study may be
useful to managers who seek to enhance their firm performance through corporate
governance. The findings could lead to increased awareness of the importance of strong
corporate governance practices, not only for direct improvement of firm performance but also
indirectly, through external factors. The results of the study can be a useful source for
legislators, regulators, and other interested parties in the UAE following the implementation
of the corporate governance code. The index results clarify the items that need more
enforcement and the items that have improved. Future studies may wish to investigate more
additional relationships between external factors that could be affected by corporate
governance. These variables may include financing related variables such as share
repurchase and cost of equity or image related variables such as corporate social
responsibility and tax avoidance. This research can also be expanded to other emerging
markets and larger data sets.
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